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1. Introduction 
The size of Dutch direct investment flows to transition countries is often considered high because 
relatively many Dutch enterprises invest in the region. On the other hand there is evidence that many 
more Dutch firms are in principle interested in an investment but never really undertake the action (van 
de Laar, 2004). Difficulties in financing the investment are often mentioned as an important obstacle, 
even though the financial sector in the transition countries has improved considerable the last decade 
(EBRD, 1999; Pissarides, 2001; Klapper et al, 2002). The question this study focuses on is whether 
financial obstacles are indeed the main reason for firms not to invest in the transition region, or if other 
less often mentioned factors also play an important role in this decision. 
In 1989 the countries in Central and Eastern Europe started a transition to a market economy, 
followed by the former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1991. While the changes were enormous for the CEECs 
(Central and Eastern European countries) and Central Asia, also for the Netherlands the collapse of 
communism was influential (EBRD, 1999). Not only the hostility between the East and West 
decreased as the cold war ended, but at the same time a huge market opened up for trade and 
investments. Foreign trade and investments were always kept as low as possible in the 20th century 
(Ebbersbach, 1982). Given that the focus in the socialist countries was on industrialization, there was 
a shortage of consumer goods and the quality of the goods that were available was generally low. The 
transition countries thus formed a large new market for Dutch enterprises to explore; countries in 
which it was now possible to invest (Blanchard, 1997).  
In this study the focus is on Dutch direct investments to Central and Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia in 1990-2000. Engaging in a foreign direct investment (FDI) in a transition country during the 
1990s offered attractive prospects for Dutch enterprises. Allowing foreign enterprises to become active 
in transition countries meant opening up a land of opportunities in the form of a large region with 
abundant natural resources relatively close by. In addition, the region was characterized by a lack of 
production and entrepreneurial skills to develop the market in the short run. Given the fact that local 
and foreign investments were low, possibilities were present in almost every field to set up a company 
without facing much competition1. In other words, if a company delivered a product or service that was 
absent or of a better quality than the supply in a transition country, or if a company was better able to 
manage its company efficiently, there were ample possibilities to become profitable. An increase of 
Dutch FDI in the region in the 1990s was therefore expected and those investments were also 
expected to be successful2 (Meyer, 2000, Lankes et al, 1996). 
In 1989 the total stock of Dutch direct investments in the world was 73443 million euro, equaling 
0.03 percent of the Dutch GDP. 48 percent of this amount was invested in Europe, 45 percent in North 
and South America and eight percent in the rest of the world. Dutch FDI to Europe flows mainly to the 
countries from the European Union3. In 1989 less than one percent of this stock was invested in the 
CEECs or Soviet Union. None of the countries in the CEE region or the former Soviet Union recorded 
a stock of Dutch FDI above one million euro. The EU countries received an FDI per capita of 88,4 euro 
                                                 
1 Foreign direct investments were kept as low as possible before 1989 in centrally planned economies, but there was some FDI. 
The presence of foreign companies was allowed for companies that had entered the region before the countries became 
centrally planned, or in Romania and Hungary after 1971 and 1972 respectively, where joint venture laws were in place 
(Ebbersbach, 1982). 
2 Foreign direct investment is defined as net inflows (or stock) of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (ten 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments 
(International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook).  
3 The eight transition countries that entered the EU in 2004 are included in this paper as transition countries, since those 
countries were not a member of the EU yet when the data used in this paper were collected.  
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in 1989, whereas the FDI per capita in 1989 in the CEECs and FSU equaled only two eurocent (De 
Nederlandsche Bank data). Based on these data a catch up effect of the CEECs and FSU could be 
expected, leading to higher FDI inflows in the 1990s. Dutch FDI to the CEECs and FSU increased 
enormously since 1989 (see graph one). In 2002, the total FDI stock in the region was 13.600 million 
euro, resulting in an FDI stock per capita of 37.5 euro. This amount is almost 1900 times as high as 
the FDI per capita in 1989. However, the division of FDI over the countries shows large inequalities. 
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia jointly received about 90 percent of the total FDI, 
leaving the other 21 countries with only ten percent. This large inequality is clearly shown by the trend 
lines in graph one; the EU accession countries received a lot more FDI than the rest of Central and 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  
 
Graph 1: Yearly FDI inflows and stock  
Graph 1a Yearly FDI inflows
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Source: De Nederlandsche Bank Balance of Payments data 
 
Even though the increase in FDI was high in the transition countries, many firms either do not 
consider an investment in that region, or they do consider an investment but eventually decide not to 
invest. The literature, discussed in section two, suggests this could be due to the lack of financing 
means available to firms. These difficulties are especially present for the small and medium sized 
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enterprises (SMEs4), since those companies often have less private or company funds available to 
finance their investment and therefore need to rely more on external financing means. Lending locally 
is difficult because of an underdeveloped banking sector and local and Dutch banks are hesitant to 
finance those ventures because of the high risks involved in an investment and the moral hazard 
problem they face5. However, the results from the Dutch firm level survey data used in this paper 
suggest that there are possibly several other reasons that negatively influence the investment 
decision. The purpose of this paper is therefore to test the assumption that financial reasons are the 
main reason not to invest or if other reasons prevail. 
In section two, literature on FDI to transition countries is summarized with specific focus on the 
financial obstacles those firms face when investing abroad. Section three includes a description of the 
database. In section four firm level data are analyzed in order to find out what holds firms from 
investing and to what extent these obstacles can be removed by policy measures. Section five 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature overview 
This literature overview summarizes the financing problems of SMEs investing in transition countries 
and not specifically the problems of foreign entrants. This is due to the fact that SMEs, being local or 
foreign, face most difficulties with respect to financing. However, since most Dutch enterprises 
entering the region are SMEs, they are likely to encounter similar problems. Larger MNEs 
(multinational enterprises) generally have better internal and external access to finance and the 
described problems will affect their entrance decision less. In the analysis in section four both SMEs 
and MNEs are included. 
There are several reasons why financing direct investments in transition countries can be difficult. 
The origin of most of the financial problems lies in the fact that the transition countries do not have a 
long commercial banking history. During the socialist time (before 1989-1991) there was a mono 
banking system, with the state as owner of all banks, centrally and locally. During transition a dual 
banking system was installed, with a central bank and independent commercial banks. State-owned 
banks were privatized and foreign banks were often allowed to enter the market6 (Calvo et al, 1994).  
Commercial banks faced several difficulties during their first years of operation (Blommenstein et al, 
1993). They inherited a portfolio of loans that was consisting in large of bad loans, meaning loans that 
were provided to previously state-owned firms that were not operating according to the hard budget 
constraint. Banks either needed to write off those bad loans, which meant accepting a large loss, or 
they renewed bad loans, keeping the soft budget constraint in place (OECD, 1998; EBRD, 1999; 
Roland, 2000; Kornai, 2001). This last option led to crowding out, since there were no means available 
to provide finance to newly established firms (including foreign enterprises) as well. On top of that, 
commercial banks faced a moral hazard problem because the newly commercial enterprises did not 
have business history and accounting standards of companies were often missing or poor. This left the 
banks without a clear mechanisms to select the goods initiatives from the bad ones. 
                                                 
4 SMEs are defined in this paper as firms with less than 200 employees. The literature overview in section two focuses on those 
SMEs, but the results of the survey described in section 4 also include larger firms.  
5 Not only the transition countries are risky host countries, also the FDIs themselves are a risky investment. FDIs are often 
newly established firms set up in a country the investor has no experience in, thus for banks it is hard to judge how solid their 
investment in such an FDI will be.  
6 Of course this process took time. Especially in the early years of transition many commercial banks were owned by the state 
and foreign banks were not in all countries allowed immediately after the start of transition. 
 5
In addition to the bad loan problem banks had to operate in a market without clear regulations and a 
lack of corporate governance, specifically with respect to ownership regulations and financial rules. 
This lack of corporate governance led to conflicting interests of the state, often still in part owner of the 
banks, privatization funds and state-owned enterprises7 (OECD, 1998). The lack of regulations and 
bad implementation of existing regulations in many countries led to a surge of new banks, without 
proper rules of engagement. Banks often provided finance to firms without having the necessary 
reserve ratios, resulting in a large amount of loans without proper monetary backup. The quality of 
banks was dispersed and there was no individual bank history customers could build on when 
selecting their commercial bank. In several countries financial crises occurred, for instance because of 
bank runs (in the Baltic countries, Weller & Morzuch, 1999) and pyramid schemes (in Albania, EBRD, 
1999).  
Last, there was no or little confidence in the local banking sector by the population. Individuals were 
hesitant to deposit their savings on local bank saving accounts, for ample reasons. The lack of a 
sound banking system under communism taught individuals to keep their savings in cash. This opinion 
was supported by the fact that the hyperinflation rates present in the early years of transition were not 
compensated for by high interest rates, thus in real terms the monetary value of saving accounts 
decreased constantly. Therefore many individuals opted for an exchange of their savings in dollars 
and kept their savings money at home. Consequently, banks were short of deposits (especially long 
term deposits) and thus unable to provide long term finance. In addition, the international country 
ratings of transition countries was low, making lending at the international capital market difficult as 
well.   
Solutions suggested to deal with these financial sector problems are to install and implement clear 
regulations, clean the bad loan portfolios (write off bad loans) and continue to provide financial 
sources only to profitable firms operation according to hard budget constrains. These solutions are of 
course time and money consuming.  
The presence of multinational banks does not necessarily increase the financial sources provided to 
small and medium sized enterprises in the short run. While from the host country perspective the 
presence of foreign banks does strengthens the banking system and improves the low level of 
financial intermediation, it is questionable to what extent local enterprises and SMEs benefit from their 
presence (de Haas et al, 2002)8. As Weller (2000) argues, the increase of multinational banks in 
Poland from zero to fifteen between 1991 and 1997 was accompanied by an overall decrease in the 
ratio of credit to private and public enterprises to GDP. Weller argues that the presence of 
multinational banks is not necessarily a merit for the local banks, since those multinational banks have 
a competitive advantage in terms of reputation and therefore often serve credit supply to the lower risk 
multinational corporations. Multinational banks generally do not offer services to SMEs, with the 
exception of SMEs from their home country. But even then, the service is limited to representing the 
bank locally and short-term finance is generally only provided to the home country SMEs if the home 
                                                 
7 This problem was particularly present in countries that used forms of mass privatization and needed to establish privatization 
funds in a short period of time. For instance in the Czech Republic voucher privatization, combined with lack of corporate 
governance lead to a banking crisis. Situations occurred in which the government was (in part) the owner of the bank and the 
owner of the firm and the bank was owner of privatization funds. Banks provided soft loans to the state owned enterprises and 
the control mechanism in the form of monitoring privatization funds failed since they were owned indirectly by the state as well 
(OECD, 1998; EBRD, 1999).  
8 De Haas and van Lelyveld (2002) test how stable foreign financial intermediation is during financial crises and find that 
greenfield investments contribute to credit stability whereas takeovers reduce their credit supply during  financial crises. They 
conclude that greenfield banking activites overall have a positive impact on stability whereas privatization of domestic banks 
does not lead to similar stability effects. 
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country bank is willing to support the transaction and guarantee financial security w.r.t. the loan.9 Local 
banks are left to deal with the higher risk small and medium sized enterprises or start-up companies, 
which are not seen as profitable by banks. Domestic banks are thus left more exposed to risk and the 
most straightforward method of reducing their risks is reducing their loans. As a result smaller and 
younger firms are more likely to experience financial constraints than their older and mature 
counterparts and firms that face financial constraints are more likely to postpone an investment 
(Corricelli and Djankov, 2001; Weller, 2000; Laar, van de and Letterie, 2003). De Haas and van 
Lelyveld (2002) conclude in their study that foreign bank credit compared to GDP has increased in five 
transition countries during the years 1993-2000 and also increased in importance compared to 
domestic credit10. Again, this could be an indication that although foreign credits increase they could 
be crowding out local banks and SMEs would have more difficulty receiving intermediary services. 
Empirical studies analyzing micro data of firms investing in transition countries confirm that financing 
problems are high in the region11. However, almost all studies add that lack of finance is not the main 
or only problem. In her study to financial structures in Southeast Europe, Pissarides (2001) concludes 
that enterprises rely mainly on internal financing sources to finance investments. She also argues that 
finance alone is insufficient to support enterprise entry and a beneficial investment climate and good 
investment support-structure are of equal importance. This last point is one of the results of the EBRD 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey as well (EBRD, 1999). Survey results 
indicate there are four categories of barriers of entry for start-up firms, being i) (lack of) macro-
stabilization (inflation), ii) (lack of) legal institutional norms (corruption), iii) micro level financing 
constraints and iv) micro-level non-financing constraints (taxes, regulations). The key finding is that 
even though financing is a major problem, it is of less importance as a critical barrier for start-ups 
when compared to the other three mentioned barriers.   
Klapper et al. (2002) study the financing of SMEs using survey data of 97.000 SMEs in the transition 
region. In this study it is shown that the SME sector in transition countries is still underdeveloped and 
the SMEs employ very few individuals. They conclude that financial constraints could impede growth 
of the SMEs in the region, though also larger firms in the region do not attain high growth rates. With 
respect to investment financing, SMEs are mainly borrowing short-term debt; this seems to be the only 
external financing type they can access.  
Looking at financing constraints specifically, a number of problems become apparent. First, the need 
for connections within banks and other financial institutions is high in order to secure access to 
financial services. This is a clear disadvantage for SMEs and start-up firms compared to their larger 
older more established counterparts. Second, there is a lack of long-term bank loans, since the 
financial institutions themselves have a shortage of long-term deposits and therefore impose 
immensely high collateral requirements and high interest rates on the long-term lending transactions 
they are willing to finance. Last, the large paperwork and immense bureaucracy involved in acquiring a 
loan are very time consuming and therefore difficult for SMEs to deal with. These problems are largest 
in Southeast Europe and the CIS countries and less in Central Asia and the Central European States 
(EBRD, 1999; Pissarides, 2001; Klapper et al., 2002).  
 
                                                 
9 Long-term finance is generally not considered. 
10 Domestic credits decreased as percentage of GDP since 1998 in Estonia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Only in 
Slovenia the percentage of domestic credit to GDP was higher in 2000 than in 1998. 
11 Again, these studies focus on SMEs and not on FDI specifically. However, the problems are similar for Dutch SMEs trying to 
finance their investment abroad.   
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3. Survey data 
In 2000 a survey was held among Dutch firms that were interested to invest in the CEE region. In total 
1550 firms were asked to participate in the survey. All firms either participated in a seminar or had 
requested information about doing business in the CEE region from the Dutch Chambers of 
Commerce. Of the 1550 firms in the sample, 330 firms responded by answering the questionnaire, of 
which 88 invested in the CEE region and 242 did not invest. The survey has a response rate of 23.4 
percent12. Eligible criteria for this research were that the firm had to be (partially) Dutch and the 
investment decision was made in the Netherlands. Firms that were ineligible based on those criteria 
are excluded from the database (7 investors and 25 noninvestors). Before questioning firms about 
their investment process in the questionnaire, the firms interested in the CEE region but not in an FDI 
were excluded (74 firms), as well as the firms that were in principle interested in an FDI but not in an 
FDI in the CEE region (94 firms). 130 firms remained in the dataset that seriously considered an FDI in 
the region.  
 
4. Financing problems of Dutch enterprises 
In order to see whether financial reasons are the main reason for Dutch enterprises not to invest 
abroad the before mentioned database is particularly suitable, since it not only includes those firms 
that did invest but also firms that were interested to invest but decided not to engage in an FDI. For 
simplicity purposes, the investment decision process is divided in 3 phases (see Figure one). Phase 
one, the orientation phase, contains the complete group of firms interested in an investment in the 
CEECs, that followed a seminar or requested promotion materials (total 330 firms). Firms enter phase 
two, the analysis phase, if they are eligible, selected one or more alternative host countries in the 
region and analyzed the possibilities of success of an investment in those countries. This group 
contains 81 investors and 49 noninvestors that already selected a potential host country to invest in. In 
phase three, the implementation phase, firms are included that decided to invest in a transition country 
and started implementing their investment.  
In phase one, 168 firms indicated they were only interested in an FDI to a very limited extent. The 
majority of those firms (99 firms, 59 percent) never seriously considered an FDI in the CEECs but 
attended the seminars for other business purposes. These 99 firms can be divided in 25 firms that did 
not consider an FDI in general and 74 firms there were specifically not considering an FDI in the 
transition countries. The second group of firms (55 firms, 33 percent) indicated they decided to export 
their goods or services to the CEECs instead of engaging in a direct investment. The economic and 
political development of the region was also often mentioned as reason not to invest (13 and 6 
respectively). Another five percent of the firms (8 firms) indicated that previous negative experiences 
with the CEECs led to their decision not to invest. Only four firms (two percent) indicated they decided 
not to consider an investment because there were no financial means available for an investment.13 
These results indicate that in an early phase of the investment process the lack of finance is not the 
                                                 
12 The respondents display a non-response bias in favor of larger older firms and firms with an investment in the CEE region. In 
order to take these non-response biases into account, the analysis of the data is done with and without correction for non-
response bias. In the former analysis the data are taken with each observation weighted as one. For the latter analysis, a 
probability is calculated for each respondent that a firm with certain characteristics would answer the survey. The data are then 
weighted using the inverse probability of response, thus taking the non-response bias into account. The results of the weighted 
analysis are not distinctly different from the unweighted results, therefore only the unweighted results are described in this 
paper.  
13 These four firms are all small firms, including one firm with less than five employees, two firms with 10-20 employees and one 
firm with 20-50 employees.  
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main reason to decide not to invest. More often the initial market study of a firm shows that either the 
CEE market is not the best region for investment or that an FDI is not the most suitable market-
servicing instrument for that region.14  
The firms that enter phase two are firms that all consider one or several transition countries as an 
interesting host countries and consider an FDI as the best market servicing mode for this region. This 
group of firms includes 81 investors and 49 non-investors. Only those 81 firms that decide to invest 
enter phase three, the implementation phase (see figure one). Table one includes summary statistics 
of the company groups "not interested", "noninvestors" and "investors". Contrary to the literature 
predictions, “investors” are significantly younger than the “noninvestors” and “not interested firms” at a 
five percent level15. In line with the general findings investors are slightly larger than the firms that 
decided not to invest at a ten percent level16. With respect to sector division no significant differences 
are found. Concluding, investors are significantly younger and larger than noninterested and 
noninvesting forms, but it remains questionable if those company characteristics explain the choice of 
firms to invest or not given these results are not in line with the general findings in the literature17. 
Thus, it is interesting to see whether the decision to invest can be explained by the choices made in 
the analysis phase. 130 firms entered phase two. They selected one or several alternative host 
countries in which they considered to invest and answered questions related to the kind of FDI and the 
method of financing they intended to use. In table two the results of those questions are included. 
Dutch investors highly value full ownership; given the fact that 55 percent of the investments was 
either a newly established firm (Greenfield) or a takeover (Brownfield). The firms that decided not to 
invest were more in favor of joint ventures. Possibly this is a crucial factor in their decision not to 
invest, since the decision not only depends on their own perspective but also on the perspective of 
their partner in the joint venture. 
With respect to financing the data indicate there is, as the literature in section two described, a 
serious problem with financing through intermediaries. A majority of the firms use own money - either 
private or firm money - to finance their investment, whereas only 10-20 percent of the firms intend to 
finance their FDI by bank loans. This is easily understood when taking the high collateral rules both in 
the host country but also in the Netherlands into account (Klapper et al., 2002). Banks in the host 
country are not often considered an alternative for financing the investment. Again, this is probably 
predominantly due to the fact that the rules and regulations with respect to providing loans are not 
beneficial for the entrepreneur. On the other hand, the informal sector is never mentioned as financial 
source, even though this is a common financing method in the transition region (Pissarides, 2000). 
Subsidies, gifts and insurances are relatively more considered by noninvestors than by investors. This 
could for instance be due to the fact that applying for subsidies is time consuming and time and 
capacity are generally scarce resources in SMEs. Another explanation could be that even though 
there are several forms of subsidies or support available, SMEs are unfamiliar with their existence or 
are (or consider themselves) ineligible for participation in those programs.  
                                                 
14 The percentages do not add to 100 percent, since each firm was allowed to select multiple answer options in the 
questionnaire why not to invest.  
15 T-test results show a t-value of  t=1.8689 with p>t=1.03. Investors are also significantly younger that the non-interested group 
separately (t=1.986, p>t = 0.02), but insignificantly younger than the noninvestors (t=0.8383, p>t=0.20). All tests are done 
assuming unequal variances. 
16 Investors have on average 329  employees in 1989, noninvestors and noninterested firms have on average 187 employees. 
Seven outliers with more than 10.000 employees are excluded. three investors and four noninvestors. T-test results show a t-
value of -1.4414 with p<t=0.0760. If the outliers remain included, investors are also significantly larger at a ten percent level.  
17 See for instance Horst (1972), Grubaugh (1987), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) and Meyer (1998). 
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Figure 1: Investment decision phases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Questionnaire Dutch direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Maastricht University, 2000 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of firms not interested in an FDI, noninvestors 
and investors in the CEECs 
  Firms not interested in an 
FDI in the CEECs 
(n=168) 
Noninvestors 
Firms interested in an FDI in 
the CEECs that decided not 
to invest (n=49) 
Investors 
Firms interested in an FDI in 
the CEECs that decided to 
invest (n=81) 
Sector division18 
- Agriculture 
- Industry 
- Construction 
- Logistics 
- Financial Services 
- Retail 
- Other 
 Nr. of firms (% division) 
17 (10%) 
88 (52%) 
16 (10%)  
9 (5%) 
1 (1%) 
29 (17%) 
8 (5%) 
Nr. of firms (% division) 
8 (16%) 
22 (45%) 
3 (6%) 
1 (2%) 
2 (4%) 
10 (20%) 
3 (6%) 
Nr. of firms (% division) 
10 (12%) 
29 (36%) 
4 (5%) 
12 (15%) 
3 (4%) 
15 (19%) 
8 (10%) 
Average age 42.5 39.3 34.5 
Number of employees19  
<5 
5-10 
11-20 
21-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201-500 
>500 
Nr. of firms (% division) 
31 (18%) 
14 (8%)        
21 (13%)       
31 (18%)    
21 (13%)     
19 (11%)       
17 (10%)     
14(8%)   
Nr. of firms (% division) 
14 (29%) 
4 (8%) 
7 (14%) 
6 (12%) 
4 (8%) 
5 (10%) 
5 (10%) 
3 (6%) 
Nr. of firms (% division) 
17 (21%) 
5 (6%) 
9 (11%) 
9 (11%) 
9 (11%) 
7 (9%) 
8 (10%) 
16 (20%) 
Source: Questionnaire Dutch direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Maastricht University, 2000 
                                                 
18 The group “other" includes firms from the sectors “water, gas and electricity”, ”hotels and restaurants”, “government services”, 
“health” and “environment, culture and recreation”. Percentages that add up to more than 100 percent are due to rounding off. 
19 Measured in number of employees in 1999. 
No 
Yes 
No 
Phase 2: Analysis (130 firms)  
The firms selected an alternative host country.  
Do those firms invest in the CEECs? 
 
Phase 3: Implementation (81 firms) 
Invest 
Yes 
Ineligible:  7 investors and 25 noninvestors  
 
168 not interested in an FDI 
 59% Not seriously interested in an FDI 
 33% Export instead of FDI 
 13% CEECs not developed enough   
 6% Political instability 
 5% Negative experiences with the region 
 2% Financial reasons 
49 noninvestors (% based on response of 36 firms) 
  39% Uncertainty in the firm or the market 
  25% Lack of time or capacity in the Netherlands 
  25% Internal reasons of the Dutch firm 
  14% Temporary postponement 
  14% Insufficient expected profit or return 
  11% Problems with partner in the host country 
    8% Problems with reliability of the information  
    8% Financial reasons 
Phase 1: Orientation (330 firms) 
- Are the firms eligible?  
- Are the firms interested in an FDI in the 
CEECs 
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Table 2: Information on the (intended) kind of FDI and method of finance 
 Investors (n=81) Noninvestors (n=49) 
(Intended) kind of FDI 
- Greenfield 
- Brownfield 
- Joint venture 
- Privatization process 
- Other 
Nr. of firms (% division) 
10 (12%) 
35 (43%) 
27 (33%) 
1 (1%) 
8 (10%) 
Nr. of firms (% division) 
12 (24%) 
4 (8%) 
26 (53%) 
3 (6%) 
4 (8%) 
(Intended) method of financing* 
- Private capital of the owner 
- Private capital of the Dutch firm 
- Loan from financial sector in the Netherlands 
- Loan from the financial sector in the host country 
- Private capital or loan from partner in the host country 
- Loan from family or friends 
- Gifts, subsidies, insurances 
Nr. of firms (%) 
16 (20%) 
61 (75%) 
9 (11%) 
1 (1%) 
5 (6%) 
0 (0%) 
6 (7%) 
Nr. of firms (%) 
9 (18%) 
30 (61%) 
12 (24%)   
  
5 (10%) 
6 (12%) 
0 (0%) 
10 (20%) 
* The firms could select multiple answer options, thus percentages do not have to 100 percent. 
Source: Questionnaire Dutch direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Maastricht University, 2000 
 
Studying the method of finance by size of the firm learns that small firms most often use their own 
capital as main financial source, whereas larger firms rely more on intermediaries. Noninvestors 
planned to use bank loans more often as source of finance than investors, indicating that a failure to 
obtain such loans could be a reason not to invest. 
A study on the relation between the extensiveness of the investment analysis undertaken by the 
investors and noninvestors in phase two and their final decision does not show any significant results. 
There is no evidence for the idea that noninvestors analyze the investment possibility less thorough 
and remain less informed and therefore decide not to invest. Vice versa, the idea that noninvestors are 
initially already less interested than investors and therefore undertake a less thorough investment 
analysis before deciding not to invest is incorrect as well. The survey data indicate that, once firms 
enter phase two of the investment decision, their analysis is of similar size irrespective of the outcome 
of the analysis (van de Laar, 2004 forthcoming). 
The influence of the kind of (envisaged) FDI and the (envisaged) financing method on the 
investment decision is larger (see table three). Using a logit analysis I test whether among other 
variables the financing method influences the decision to invest, with investment as dependent 
variable. The results in table three indicate that of the firms in phase two, the firms that intend to invest 
by takeover are significantly more likely to invest than firms that wanted to set up a completely new 
company or invest in a joint venture. In addition, financing the investment using own means increases 
the chance a firm invests significantly, whereas financing the investment through financial 
intermediaries or financial means brought in by the partner firm does not influence the chance to 
invest. These results indicate that financing an FDI externally is a serious problem and firms that 
circumvent these problems by using their own means are more likely to invest.  
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Table 3: Logit analysis to the determinants of FDIs 
Variable Coefficient (standard error) 
Age -0.005 
( 0.008)   
Size  0.000 
(0.000)    
Year  -0.271*** 
(0.081)   
Takeover 1.934*** 
(0.689)    
Joint Venture -0.275 
(0.515)   
Finance using private or company means 1.4290** 
(0.681)    
Finance using the financial sector in the Netherlands -0.413 
(0.623)   
Finance using the financial sector in the host country -1.939 
(1.472)   
Finance using sources from the partner firm -0.530 
(0.815)   
Constant 1.468* 
(0.851)    
Pseudo R2 0.267*** 
Number of observations n=129 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
Investing in a Greenfield FDI is taken as baseline. 
Size was measured in number of employees in 1989 
Year is the year the FDI was considered, measured in years that elapsed after the start of transition, so 1989=1, 1990=2 etc. 
 
However, this does not mean that lack of finance is the ultimate reason for firms not to invest. In 
order to get a better idea what the major reasons were for firms not to invest, firms were asked to 
answer three reasons in open format. Since firms did not have to choose from already given answer 
options, the most correct description of reasons why they did not invest is provided. After categorizing 
the mentioned reasons it became clear that, even though the previous results show finance is a 
problem, the major reasons not to invest were not of a financial nature. The reason most often 
mentioned was the uncertainty attached to the investment (in the form of for example uncertain 
payment structures, uncertain privatization process or uncertain regulations and a huge bureaucracy). 
25 percent of the firms also mentioned a lack of time and capacity of Dutch firms as well as internal 
reasons (such as a too low profit of the Dutch firm or the choice to focus on the home market) (see 
figure one). Concrete financing problems were only mentioned by three firms (eight percent) . These 
results are in line with the results from the EBRD survey, confirming that like SMEs. also for Dutch 
firms investing in an FDI macro-economic instability, and micro-level non-financing constraints 
(uncertainty within the firm, internal reasons) are more important than financial obstacles. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In literature on SMEs in transition countries it is often mentioned that the lack of a well developed 
financial sector in transition countries is a major reason for firms not to invest there. In addition, 
several studies indicate that other problems, like the uncertainty in the countries with respect to 
macroeconomic developments or political stability, or the lack of a legal infrastructure are of equal or 
even bigger importance for firms. Also foreign firms investing in a transition country face those 
problems. In this study Dutch survey data are used to check if financial obstacles are an important 
argument for Dutch firms not to engage in an FDI or if other nonfinancial arguments prevail in the 
decision not to invest.  
The analysis shows that financial problems are indeed large, given that most of the FDI undertaken 
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is financed with own means instead of using the services of financial intermediaries such as Dutch 
banks or banks in the host countries. Reasons for not using intermediary services are that financial 
intermediaries often require high collateral or ask high interest rates to secure the loans. Subsidies, 
gifts and insurances are not often used by the firms. Whether this is due to the fact that the available 
sources of subsidies are unknown or SMEs do not have the time and resources available to start a 
procedure remains unclear. Firms that intend to invest by takeover are significantly more likely to 
invest than firms that want to set up a completely new company or a joint venture. In addition, firms 
that (want to) finance their FDI with own means are more likely to invest, indicating that if a firm does 
not have the necessary financial means available to finance the FDI, the chance that it will be able to 
invest using other financial means is smaller.  
However, the major arguments for firms not to invest are not financial in nature. The uncertainty of 
the investment, lack of time and capacity and internal arguments are most often mentioned as 
obstacles for an FDI. Financial reasons were given as well, but less often. This study therewith 
supports this argument offered by the mentioned empirical work undertaken in this field. Not only 
financial services to companies interested in an FDI in a transition country should be improved but  
institutional development and capacity assistance within companies during the investment decision 
procedure are of equal importance for a positive investment decision. 
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